Jihad in Syria
Jihad in Syria
- This
report examines the presence of jihadist groups within Syria, explains where various Syrian rebel
groups and foreign elements operating in Syria fall along the spectrum
of religious ideology, and considers their aggregate effect upon the
Islamification of the Syrian opposition.
- The
Syrian conflict began as a secular revolt against autocracy. Yet as the
conflict protracts, a radical Islamist dynamic has emerged within the
opposition. There is a small but growing jihadist presence inside Syria, and this presence within the
opposition galvanizes Assad’s support base and complicates U.S.
involvement in the conflict. - See more at: http://www.understandingwar.org/report/jihad-syria#sthash.OELutWQj.dpuf
- Internally,
Assad has used the threat of jihadists within the opposition to build
support for the regime among the Alawite and Christian communities.
It has also served to discourage middle and upper class Sunnis from
joining the opposition. Externally, Russian and Iranian leadership
have consistently pointed to the presence of radical Islamists as a
critical rationale for their support of the Assad regime. Compared to
uprisings in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia,
the opposition in Syria
faces a much greater threat of jihadist infiltration. …
- Moderate
political Islam is not incompatible with democratic governance. However,
ultraconservative Sunni Islamists, known as Salafists, envision a new
world order modeled on early Islam that poses a significant threat to both
democracy and the notion of statehood. Salafi-jihadists are those who
commit to violent means to bring about the Salafi vision.…
- The
vast majority of Syrians opposing the regime are local revolutionaries
still fighting against autocracy; while they are not Islamists, in the
sense that their political visions do not depend upon Islamic principles,
they espouse varying degrees of personal religious fervor. There are also
moderate Islamists operating within the Syrian opposition, including those
who comprise rebel groups like Suquor al-Sham and the Umma Brigade, who
are typified by a commitment to political Islam that is compatible with
democracy. - See more at: http://www.understandingwar.org/report/jihad-syria#sthash.OELutWQj.dpuf
- Al-Qaeda’s
direct involvement in Syria
has been exaggerated in the media. However, small al-Qaeda affiliated
networks are operating in the country, including elements of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abdullah
Azzam Brigades, Fatah al-Islam and Jordanian Salafi-jihadists. Rather than
sending large numbers of operatives, these networks are providing
operational support, including trainers and bomb makers, in order to
capitalize on the instability in Syria and expand their
influence in the region.
- The U.S. cannot afford to support groups that
will endanger Syria’s
future stability. However, if the U.S. chooses to limit its
contact with Islamist groups altogether, it may alienate a majority of the
opposition. Identifying the end goals of opposition groups will be
the key to determining whether their visions for Syrian governance are
compatible with U.S.
interests. - See more at: http://www.understandingwar.org/report/jihad-syria#sthash.OELutWQj.dpuf
- The
U.S. Government has cited concern over arming jihadists as a reason for
limiting support to the Syrian opposition. However, U.S. allies are already providing material
support to the Syrian opposition, and competing sources of funding
threaten Syria’s
future stability by enhancing the influence of more radical elements. The
confluence of jihadist interest with that of the Gulf states raises the possibility that
these states may leverage jihadists for their own strategic purposes,
while simultaneously limiting Western influence.
- In
order to counter this effect, the U.S. should seek to channel
this support in a way that bolsters responsible groups and players while
ensuring that Salafi-jihadist organizations such as Jabhat Nusra are
unable to hijack the opposition movement. If the U.S. hopes
to counter this threat and stem the growing popularity of more radical
groups, it must clearly identify secular and moderate Islamist opposition
groups and encourage the international community to focus resources in support
of those groups alone. Such focused support would increase the
influence of moderate opposition groups and undercut the appeal of
Salafism in Syria.
